

Message Text

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TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

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CCD FOR AMB MARTIN

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DRAFT TEXT OF SPEECH FOR USE BY AMB MARTIN IN
HELSINKI

1. THE FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF SPEECH FOR DELIVERY BY
AMB MARTIN DURING VISIT TO HELSINKI.

2. BEGIN TEXT: IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT I SHOULD MAKE A
SPEECH ON ARMS CONTROL IN HELSINKI. THIS IS A CITY WHICH
HAS PLAYED HOST TO THE SUCCESSFUL BEGINNING OF THE SALT
NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CON-
FERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. YOU HAVE
EVERY RIGHT TO BE PROUD OF THE ROLE OF HELSINKI AS A FOCAL
POINT OF PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL, NOT ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT
OF EUROPE BUT FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

TONIGHT I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU MY COUNTRY S APPROACH
TO PEACE THROUGH ARMS CONTROL. THIS IS A BASIC TENET OF THE
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. THE FUNDAMENTAL AIM IS
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INCREASED SECURITY THROUGH AGREED LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS
OF ARMAMENTS -- MEASURES THAT WILL REDUCE THE DANGER OF WAR,
OR LESSEN ITS DESTRUCTIVENESS IF EFFORTS TO AVERT WAR FAIL.
THE IDEA THAT NATIONS CAN INCREASE THEIR SECURITY AND MAKE

WARS LESS LIKELY BY CONSENTING TO CONTROL THEIR ARMAMENTS REFLECTS A FUNDAMENTAL AMERICAN OPTIMISM ABOUT THE MANAGEABILITY OF HUMAN PROBLEMS.

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ARMS REVOLUTION IS HARD TO GRASP. IN THIS ERA OF INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES, MILITARY STRENGTH ALONE CANNOT SHIELD US FROM DEVASTATING NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION AT HOME. WE MUST MANAGE OUR MILITARY STRENGTH IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE SELF-INTEREST OF POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES IMPELS THEM TO FORGO ARMED AGGRESSION AND TO COOPERATE WITH US IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR. IN SHORT, WE MUST TEACH THEM THE SELFISH PRACTICAL WISDOM OF ARMS CONTROL.

WE LIVE -- AND OF NECESSITY ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED -- IN A WORLD OF INDEPENDENT NATIONS WITH INTENSE FEARS, JEALOUSIES AND ANIMOSITIES. SOME NATIONS COVET THE TERRITORY OF OTHERS; SOME ENVY THE WEALTH OF OTHERS; AND SOME EVEN SEEK THE DESTRUCTION OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. THE FACT THAT THESE AMBITIONS ARE SOMETIMES BASED NOT ON GREED ALONE BUT ON BELIEF IN THE JUSTICE OF A PARTICULAR CAUSE DOES NOT MAKE THEM LESS DANGEROUS. IF ANYTHING, IT INCREASES THE WILLINGNESS OF SUCH NATIONS TO REALIZE THEIR AMBITIONS BY VIOLENCE IF THEY CAN.

IN A WORLD WHERE DISPUTES REMAIN AND ARMAMENTS REMAIN, WHAT CAN ARMS CONTROL DO? THERE IS NO WAY OF MAKING WAR IMPOSSIBLE. ARMS CONTROL DEMANDS COMMITMENT TO AN UNENDING TASK. OUR EFFORTS MUST BE DIRECTED AT REDUCING BOTH THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR AND THE LIKELIHOOD THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE USED IF WAR OCCURS.

DURING THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS, WE HAVE INCREASED THE SCOPE AND MOMENTUM OF OUR EFFORTS. THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS REACHED IN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, THOUGH STILL ONLY A BEGINNING, HAVE BROUGHT GREATER SECURITY TO UNCLASSIFIED

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OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES, AS WELL AS TO THE REST OF THE WORLD. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AREAS WHERE AGREED MEASURES OF CONTROL CAN PREVENT NEW FORMS OF VIOLENCE, HAVE ESTABLISHED NEW CHANNELS AND FORUMS FOR SUSTAINED NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, AND HAVE ACHIEVED NEGOTIATIONS INCREASINGLY MARKED BY CANDOR, PRECISION, AND PERSEVERANCE.

LET US TAKE A MORE DETAILED LOOK AT OUR PROGRESS -- AND PERHAPS AT SOME OF OUR FAILURES -- IN SEVERAL CRITICAL AREAS OF ARMS CONTROL.

CLEARLY, ANY DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS MUST BEGIN WITH SALT. BY ANY ESTIMATION, THESE TALKS ARE AMONG THE

MOST IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS EVER UNDERTAKEN BY MY COUNTRY. I HARDLY HAVE TO ELABORATE ON THE UNDERLYING PURPOSES OF SALT FOR THIS AUDIENCE. HOWEVER, IT IS WORTH REMINDING OURSELVES THAT SALT COULD ENHANCE STABILITY BY SETTING CONSTRAINTS ON THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. SALT COULD BRING ABOUT A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF THE DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT UNDERLIE THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE ABOLITION OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES IS NOT A REALISTIC OBJECTIVE OF INTER-NATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN U.S. POLICY, THEREFORE, THE OBJECTIVES OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO THE OBJECTIVES OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE. THAT IS TO SAY, THE PURPOSE OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL IS TO STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (IF POSSIBLE AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES), TO RENDER IT MORE STABLE, AND TO MAKE AN ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR ATTACK LESS LIKELY.

THE ISSUE OF WHAT IS REQUIRED TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE IS COMPLEX AND FREQUENTLY CONTROVERSIAL. THIS IS SO BECAUSE DETERRENCE DEPENDS ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE OF MIND OF BOTH ADVERSARIES AND ON HOW THEY INTERACT WITH EACH OTHER. IT IS SOMETIMES THOUGHT THAT DETERRENCE BEGINS AND ENDS WITH MAINTENANCE OF A RETALIATORY CAPABILITY POTENTIALLY ABLE TO DEVASTATE THE CITIES AND KILL MOST OF THE URBAN POPULATION OF A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY. THIS IS AN INADEQUATE AND FREQUENTLY MISLEADING CONCEPTION OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PURPOSE OF STRATEGIC FORCES.

INCREASINGLY WE HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT OUR STRATEGY MUST BE BASED NOT ON THE THREAT OF MEETING ANY PROVOCATION WITH A LARGE NUCLEAR RESPONSE, BUT ON A CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY. INCREASINGLY, WE RECOGNIZE THAT DETERRENCE OF A SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK MUST BE BASED ON IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES AND NOT SOLELY ON AN EARLY RESORT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THAT OUR NUCLEAR FORCE MUST BE CAPABLE OF DETERRING LIMITED AS WELL AS MASSIVE SOVIET USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND THAT FINALLY, IF DETERRENCE SHOULD EVER FAIL, WE MUST NOT DENY OURSELVES THE LAST CHANCE FOR ENDING THE FIGHTING (BEGIN UNDERLINE) SHORT (END UNDERLINE) OF ALL-OUT ATTACKS AGAINST CITIES.

IN THE CURRENT PHASE OF SALT, WE SEEK TO APPLY ALL THE LESSONS WE HAVE LEARNED IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO ILLUSION THAT OUR ADVERSARIES WILL GIVE UP SOMETHING SIMPLY IN THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION. WE KNOW THAT WE MUST NEGOTIATE VIGOROUSLY TO ATTAIN ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE. IN THIS RESPECT, PRESIDENT FORD'S ACHIEVEMENT AT VLADIVOSTOK, IN

ESTABLISHING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL CEILINGS AND A MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER REDUCTIONS, WAS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD.

PRIOR TO AGREEMENT ON THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, THE SOVIET APPROACH HAD BEEN TO ADVANCE A DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE BY VIRTUE OF THEIR RANGE OR LOCATION. THIS WAS A DEFINITION CAREFULLY TAILORED TO INCLUDE U.S. -- BUT NOT SOVIET -- TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SALT LIMITATIONS, EVEN THOUGH BOTH ARE ELEMENTS IN THE REGIONAL BALANCES IN EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST.

THE UNITED STATES APPROACH DOES NOT RULE OUT DEALING WITH REGIONAL SYSTEMS LATER OR IN OTHER DISCUSSIONS IF OUR ALLIES ARE APPROPRIATELY REPRESENTED AND INVOLVED. BUT WE STRENUOUSLY OPPOSE ATTEMPTS TO USE THEORETICAL DEFINITIONS AS A WAY OF IMPOSING ONE-SIDED LIMITATIONS ON THE REGIONAL

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FORCES OF ONE SIDE AND NOT THE OTHER. THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD, BY ESTABLISHING EQUALITY IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS -- ICBMS, SLBMS AND BOMBERS -- AND DROPPING ONE-SIDED SOVIET DEMANDS TO INCLUDE WHAT THEY CALL U.S. "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS," HAS ESTABLISHED A SOUND BASIS ON WHICH FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS CAN PROCEED. A SUCCESSFUL SALT TWO AGREEMENT WOULD REDUCE SOME OF THE UNCERTAINTY WHICH HAS OFTEN BEEN THE IMPETUS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS RACES IN THE PAST. NOT ONLY ARE THE ESTABLISHED CEILINGS BELOW THE CAPABILITIES OF EITHER SIDE, BUT PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE ELEMENT OF INSECURITY CAUSED BY "WORST CASE" ASSESSMENTS OF THE OTHER SIDES' STRATEGIC PROGRAMS WOULD BE ELIMINATED.

SALT IS BUT ONE PHASE OF THE CONTINUING NEGOTIATING ATTEMPT TO BRING THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION UNDER MANAGEABLE CONTROL. ANOTHER AREA OF CLOSE INTEREST TO YOU IS THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS IN EUROPE. EUROPE TODAY IS BURDENED BY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF HEAVILY ARMED TROOPS, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TANKS, AND THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING IN VIENNA FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS NOW, THE CENTRAL OBJECTIVES ARE TO REDUCE BOTH THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE LEVEL OF FORCES IN THE AREA, WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY. AS YOU KNOW, NATO HAS PROPOSED FORCE REDUCTIONS DOWN TO A COMMON CEILING, WHILE THE EASTERN POSITION CALLS FOR REDUCTIONS THAT WOULD PRESERVE THE PRESENT DISPARITY FAVORING THE WARSAW PACT. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD CODIFY THE MAJOR SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- THE DISPARITY IN GROUND

FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN BATTLE TANKS.

THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA -- MY OWN PARTICULAR ARENA -- IS CONSIDERING A NUMBER OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. NEGOTIATIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER WAY TO DEVELOP A COMMON DRAFT TEXT OF A CONVENTION PROHIBITING MILITARY OR ANY HOSTILE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES. ALTHOUGH AT PRESENT ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES FOR HOSTILE PURPOSES DOES NOT OCCUPY AN IMPORTANT POSITION IN MILITARY PLANNING, IN THE UNCLASSIFIED

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FUTURE SUCH TECHNIQUES MAY BECOME A NEW ARENA OF MILITARY COMPETITION.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT ACTIVITY OF THE CCD HAS BEEN ITS SPONSORSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON SEISMIC DATA. THE SWEDISH DELEGATION TO THE CCD HAS RECOMMENDED THE FORMATION OF A SPECIAL SEISMIC STUDY GROUP TO EXAMINE THE ABILITY OF A PROPOSED SEISMIC NETWORK TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS INCLUDING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. IN THIS EFFORT, THE CCD HAS BEEN SUPPORTED BY THE FINNISH CONTRIBUTION.

I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THE EFFORTS TO LIMIT VAST WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH THREATEN THE PEACE OF THE WORLD AT THE SAME TIME THEY PURPORT TO PROTECT THE PEACE. BUT PERHAPS WE FACE AN EVEN GREATER DANGER IN THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO MANY COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THIS POSSIBILITY -- SOME SAY PROBABILITY -- MAY BE A GREATER DANGER BECAUSE OF ITS INSIDIOUS NATURE.

THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS INHERENT IN THE PROCESS OF URANIUM FISSION WHICH GIVES US ACCESS TO NUCLEAR ENERGY. THE PROCESS OF HARNESSING THE ATOM FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND FOR MILITARY PURPOSES USE MUCH THE SAME TECHNOLOGY. FURTHERMORE, THE ESSENTIALS OF WEAPONS DESIGN ARE NO LONGER ESOTERIC, AND BOTH BLUEPRINTS AND MANUFACTURING TECHNIQUES ARE WELL WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF MANY NATIONS. THE RESULT IS THAT THE POSSESSION OF A CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CARRIES WITH IT THE POTENTIAL FOR THE INITIATION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

BY 1985, NEARLY 40 COUNTRIES ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE ENOUGH PLUTONIUM IN THE SPENT FUEL FROM THEIR POWER REACTORS FOR EACH TO MAKE A FEW BOMBS. THIS ESTIMATE DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT A NATION UNABLE TO PRODUCE WEAPONS MIGHT OBTAIN THEM FROM OTHERS. SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES MAY CHOOSE TO SEPARATE PLUTONIUM FROM THE SPENT FUEL. EVEN THOUGH THE PLUTONIUM MAY BE INTENDED FOR USE IN REACTORS, THE READY AVAILABILITY OF SUCH FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IS THE MOST CRITICAL FACTOR IN BEING ABLE TO

DEVELOP A WEAPON.
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IN GENERAL, THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO INHIBIT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS BY REDUCING INCENTIVES TO "GO NUCLEAR." TODAY, ABOUT 20 COUNTRIES HAVE THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE AND SEPARABLE FISSILE MATERIAL TO DESIGN AND BUILD NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. ONLY SIX HAVE DONE SO. WHY NOT THE OTHERS? BECAUSE THE MAJORITY DID NOT HAVE MOTIVATION. SOME HAVE NOT FELT THREATENED; OTHERS, ALTHOUGH THREATENED, HAVE FELT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY AN ALLIANCE; AND STILL OTHERS HAVE FELT THAT ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD CAUSE ADVERSARIES AND ALLIES TO REACT AND PERHAPS LEAVE THEM WORSE OFF.

THOSE COUNTRIES THAT ARE PROTECTED BY FIRM ALLIANCE SEEM NOT TO BE STRONGLY MOTIVATED TOWARD DEVELOPING THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THOSE OUTSIDE AN ALLIANCE OR WITH A WEAKENING RELATIONSHIP ARE MORE STRONGLY MOTIVATED. THE MESSAGE IS CLEAR: THE EROSION OF ALLIANCES STRONGLY INCREASES THE PRESSURE FOR INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

THIS MEANS THE UNITED STATES MUST PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS FOR SECURITY FELT BY NON-NUCLEAR NATIONS. THESE STATES ARE LESS LIKELY TO WANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF THEY ARE PROTECTED FROM THREAT AND ATTACK BY DEPENDABLE SECURITY ALLIANCES.

ONE PROPOSAL TO DISCOURAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WOULD HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PLEDGE NEVER TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-WEAPON STATES, WHICH, IT IS ARGUED, WOULD REDUCE THE INCENTIVE TO BUILD OPPOSING NUCLEAR FORCES. THIS PLEDGE, HOWEVER, COULD UNDERMINE THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OF EXISTING COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENTS, AND SO COULD ULTIMATELY DRIVE MORE NATIONS TO SEEK THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES MAY BE ANOTHER BARRIER TO PROLIFERATION. HERE, PARTIES IN A REGION AGREE TO DENY THEMSELVES NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PLEDGE NOT TO INTRODUCE WEAPONS INTO THE REGION. THE LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY IS AN EXAMPLE. IN THIS CONTEXT THE NON-USE PLEDGE BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWERS MAY HAVE GENUINE MERIT.
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THE SITUATION, ALTHOUGH SERIOUS, IS NOT HOPELESS. AS THE PROLIFERATION THREAT HAS DEVELOPED, SO HAVE EFFORTS TO CONTROL IT. THE UNITED STATES HAS TIGHTENED NATIONAL CONTROLS ON EXPORTS OF DANGEROUS NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE STRIVING

TO INCREASE COOPERATION WITH OTHER MAJOR SUPPLIERS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. TODAY, IN CONTRAST TO ONLY A YEAR AGO, (BEGIN UNDERLINE) ALL (END UNDERLINE) OF THE WORLD'S MAJOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIER STATES HAVE ADOPTED POLICIES TO SLOW DOWN PROLIFERATION. WE HAVE NOT ADVOCATED NATIONAL PLANS FOR RECYCLING PLUTONIUM; RATHER WE ARE SURVEYING PLANS FOR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS, IN ORDER TO RESTRICT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE DIVERSION OF WEAPONS-GRADE NUCLEAR MATERIALS FROM PEACEFUL ENERGY SYSTEMS TO ARMS PROGRAMS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS URGED ALL NATIONS TO BECOME PARTY TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THEREBY INCREASING THE CERTAINTY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS ON NATIONAL NUCLEAR CYCLES. WE ARE ALSO ACTIVELY WORKING TO IMPROVE IAEA NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS. MY COUNTRY HAS EXPENDED MANY MILLION DOLLARS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LEADING TO NEW SAFE-GUARDS CONCEPTS, TECHNIQUES AND INSTRUMENTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE SEEK TO BRING DIVERSE ELEMENTS OF NUCLEAR CYCLES UNDER IAEA CONTROL AND ARE URGING ALL SUPPLIER STATES TO INCLUDE MANDATORY IAEA INSPECTION AND SAFEGUARDS AS PART OF EVERY CONTRACT FOR REACTORS OR FUEL CYCLE ELEMENTS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN THE PEIONEER IN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, IN EFFORTS TO SHARE IT, AND IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL IT. OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE LEARNED THAT GOOD INTENTIONS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY REALISM, PERSISTENCE, AND A DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF ALL NATIONS TO WORK FOR THE GOAL OF GLOBAL ARMS CONTROL.

WE AMERICANS -- AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- HAVE LEARNED MUCH ABOUT THE HAZARDS AND THE URGENCIES THAT WE FACE, AND THE COMPLEXITIES AND DIFFICULTIES OF DEALING WITH THEM. THE CONTINUAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS
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TECHNOLOGY CAN BE EXPECTED TO POSE NEW DIFFICULTIES. AS WE TRY FOR MORE SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENTS, WE CAN EXPECT FRESH COMPLEXITIES BUT THESE SHOULD NOT DAUNT OUR PATIENCE, REALISM AND DEEP-ROOTED OPTIMISM. IT IS COMPLACENCY THAT WE MUST FEAR. PERHAPS THE BEST INSURANCE AGAINST CATASTROPHE IS THE DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE AND RENEGOTIATE, TO DEVOTE OURSELVES TO THE TASK OF MEETING NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW THREATS WITH A MEANINGFUL AND CONTINUING DIALOGUE. THE ULTIMATE GOAL SHOULD BE TO CONTINUE TO SEEK BETTER SOLUTIONS THAN ARE PROVIDED BY THE AGREEMENTS OF THE PAST. END TEXT. KISSINGER

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